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GAUTREAUX v. CITY OF CHICAGO:
IMPLEMENTATION OF DESEGREGATION ORDERS
IN PUBLIC HOUSING
Local governments usually have the power to approve or disapprove
the sites a public housing authority selects for its projects. Recently,
numerous suits have been brought by public housing tenants alleging
that local governments are intentionally choosing sites in areas of
racial concentration and thereby purposely perpetuating segregated
housing patterns. An increasing number of these suits are resulting
in a favorable judgment for the tenants. A favorable judgment, how-
ever, does not assure the implementation of an accompanying decree
designed to restore racial balance. A federal district court, to facilitate
compliance with a previous order against the Chicago Housing Au-
thority (CHA), issued an injunction suspending operation of a state
statute' that required public housing sites selected by CHA to be ap-
proved by the Chicago City Council (Council) before acquisition.2
On appeal, in Gautreaux v. City of Chicago (Gautreaux IV),3 the
Seventh Circuit held that the district court had power to suspend
the statute when it was established that the unjustified delays of the
Council in approving sites had the effect of preventing CHA's com-
pliance with the previous district court order, notwithstanding the
failure of plaintiffs to plead and prove that the Council had, by
its inaction, intentionally violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
1. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, § 9 (1971).
2. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
3. 480 F.2d 210, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1973). In terms of legal theory and this de-
cision's impact on desegregation of public housing, the second issue on appeal
i% most significant and will be the only issue given full consideration in this
Comment. The first issue concerned the district court's granting of plaintiff's
motion under Rules 21 and 19(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to add the Mayor, the Chicago City Council, and the individual alder-
men as defendants for purposes of relief. Brief for Plaintiffs at 18, Gautreaux
v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973). Prior to Gautreaux IV,
plaintiffs had named only Ct-A as defendant. The final issue was whether
the district court had abused its discretion in suspending the statute based on
assertions by the Council of hardships resulting to certain ethnic groups. Brief
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Earlier Gautreaux cases had established that CHA used racially
discriminatory practices in making site selections.4 In 1969 the district
court enjoined CHA from continuing those practices and, by restrict-
ing the locations available to CHA, directed the disestablishment of
the segregated public housing that had resulted., In 1971 CHA sub-
for Defendant Council at 21-30, Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1973).
It would seem quite easy to dispose of the first issue, but the Seventh Circuit
failed to separate the question of joinder of new parties for purposes of relief
from the question of whether, once joined, the plaintiffs were then entitled to the
relief sought in the supplemental complaint filed under Federal Rule 15(d).
Judge Sprecher, writing the majority opinion, viewed the question as one of
whether the "City Council by its earlier discriminatory actions" (Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)) "and later by its
inaction has made itself a party to the discrimination 'as a joint participant.'
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)." 480 F.2d
at 214. Judge Swygert, concurring, did not find joint participation but apparently
found that the city failed "to alleviate racial imbalance in housing" and, therefore,
was properly joined as a defendant. Id. at 216. Judge Pell, dissenting, rejected
the finding of joint participation and argued that plaintiffs should have charged
that either the Council's inaction was with the intent of violating the Constitution
or that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Id. at 218.
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1964), and Bradley v. School
Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970), support the district court's granting a motion
for joining the city as a defendant without deciding, before joinder, whether once
added as defendants, relief should be granted.
The third issue, raised by the Council's allegations that the decree would cause
hardships on various individuals and ethnic groups as examples of the district
court's abuse of its discretion, was implicitly rejected by the Seventh Circuit.
4. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, enforced, 304
F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
5. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The order states in part: "This order shall be binding upon . . . those persons,
including the members of the City Council . . . in active concert or participation
with [CHA] who receive actual notice of this order .... " Id. at 741. The prior
Memorandum Opinion contained similar language followed by referral to Rule
65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969). This statement may be the
basis for the Seventh Circuit's confusion on the issue of joinder and Judge
Sprecher's finding of joint participation. See note 3 supra. A reasonable explana-
tion for such statements was suggested by one student commentator:
The effect of the Court's order on the City Council is unclear. Certainly
the court did not mean either that the City Council approve every CHA
plan or in fact any of them. The court probably meant that members of the
City Council were bound by the court's general proscription of intentional
discrimination and that if they attempted to establish a procedure like the
"pre-clearance" procedure used previously, they would be in contempt of court.
83 HARv. L. REv. 1441, 1443 n.13 (1970).
The district court accepted in toto plaintiffs' plan for an order against CHA.
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mitted sites to the Council under a timetable imposed in Gautreaux
1.6 Unexplained delays in consideration and review of those sites by
the Council led plaintiffs to seek a means to expedite Council ap-
proval. The district court thereafter issued a decree conditioning
Chicago's receipt of Model Cities Program funds upon approval by
the Council of sufficient sites to meet the 1969 order8 The district
court based the decree on its finding that the Council had no intention
of approving the sites9 and on the Seventh Circuit's finding in Gau-
treaux II that the Department of Housing and Urban Development
had also violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights.10 The injunction
was reversed on appeal in Gautreaux III as an abuse of the court's
discretion."
Gautreaux IV was plaintiffs' attempt to correct the defects of Gau-
treaux III. A supplemental complaint was filed alleging, basically, (1)
that the 1969 order was still unfulfilled, (2) that the statutory re-
quirement of Council approval for public housing sites had the effect
of denying that relief, (3) that the Council's failure to approve sites
submitted by CHA was without justification, and (4) that because
of such an effect upon the 1969 order the statute should be suspended
for the limited purpose of allowing CHA to comply with the 1969
decree.12 After a hearing on the supplemental complaint, the district
For an excellent discussion of the plan and its various elements see Note, Public
Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 COLUA. J.L. & Soc. PioB.
253 (1970). The plan was never appealed because CHA believed it would have
impeded the construction of new housing for several years to come. Id. at 271
n.98. In fact, no public housing has been built since the 1969 order.
6. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
7. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. I1. 1971).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 368-69. The findings are more complicated than such a simple state-
ment would indicate. The Mayor had submitted a letter of intent to HUD assur-
ing the Regional Administrator that the city would process suitable sites for the
1969 order. The court found that the city had no intention of complying with
the site approval timetable set forth in the letter of intent, and that the sole
purpose of the letter was to induce HUD to grant 26 million dollars for funding
the City's Model Cities Program.
10. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). The court held that
HUD, by its knowing acquiescence in the discriminatory practices of CHA, had
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). Id. at 737.
11. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
12. Brief for Defendant Council at app. A, Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973).
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court found for plaintiffs on all issues.13 Agreeing that the effect of the
state statute was to "thwart the correction of federal constitutional
wrongs" and that the Council's failure to act could not be permitted
to produce such an effect, ihe district court enjoined the operation of
the statute.14
The "effect" test used by the district court does not seek to answer
whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face, as applied, or as
construed, thereby obviating the need to apply either equal protec-
tion or due process tests to the statute itself.'s The test seeks only to
determine whether the actions of the defendant under that statute
result in preventing the correction of constitutional wrongs.'0 The
court may resort to this test to prevent the actions or inactions of a
defendant, under color of law, from impeding the implementation of
a previous decree.'7 In such a case, the court may decree further re-
lief in the exercise of its remedial discretion without holding the
statute unconstitutional.18 The court's inquiry in such circumstances
does not include ascertaining the motive, intent or purpose of de-
fendant's actions or inactions;19 only the effect of that commission or
omission need be considered.20
The Seventh Circuit accepted the district court's application of the
effect theory, thereby rejecting the Council's argument that intent,
motive or purpose must be established to sustain a finding that
plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated."1 The court agreed
that the necessity of Council approval for CHA-selected sites had the
the effect of denying the relief granted in 1969. It also held that the
district court had the power to suspend the statutory requirement,
13. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. IlL.
1972).
14. Id. at 829-30.
15. The effect test has been used to hold a state law or local ordinance uncon-
stitutional, butthis was not the holding i Gautreaux IV. For cases that do apply
the effect test to hold a law unconstitutional see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
16. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
17. Id. at 460.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 462.
20. Id.; Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1973)
(concurring opinion).
21. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1973); Brief
for Defendant Council at 12-13, id.
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pointing out that the state policy embodied in the statute must give
way when it operates to "hinder vindication of federal constitutional
guarantees."--
An evaluation of the holding in Gautreaux IV must first focus on
the federal power of equitable relief, which has been characterized as
flexible and as embodying "[t]he qualities of mercy and practicality"
that make it an instrument suited for "adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs .... "23 The Supreme
Court has held that when federally protected rights have been invaded,
the courts may adjust their remedies to grant the necessary relief.24
The Court has additionally held that a court has not only the power
but also the duty to render a decree that will, as far as practicable,25
eliminate discrimination.26 The Court, however, has cautioned that
judicial authority enters only upon the default of local authority27
and only on the basis of a constitutional violation.28
Supreme Court cases further hold that state law is not a limitation
on the powers of the federal courts to protect a constitutional right.29
Constitutional rights can neither be nullified openly and directly by
a state legislature, executive or judge, "nor nullified indirectly through
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or
ingenuously.' "0 No matter how innocent on its face, state action is
22. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1973).
23. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). See also Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
24. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
25. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). See also
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
26. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
27. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
28. Id. Orders relating to construction of new facilities are not new to the
federal courts in school desegregation cases, and an analogy could be drawn here
to public housing. Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509
(N.D. Miss. 1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 480-81
(M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967);
see United States v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 395 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1968).
See also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967);
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Braxton, 326 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964).
29. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) ; North Caro-
lina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
30. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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"unconstitutional and null"'' if it seeks to subvert a constitutional
right, whether directly through an interposition scheme or indirectly
through a measure designed to circumvent federal court orders issued
to protect such a right.
The effect theory employed in Gautreaux IV has also been applied
in school desegregation cases. In Wright v. Council of City of Em-
poria-2 the Supreme Court held the effect theory applicable when the
district court sought to prevent frustration of its school desegregation
order by a county school board. The order had been issued when
Emporia was a voluntary participant in the county school system. A
supplemental complaint was filed that sought to prevent the city
from exercising its power under state law to create its own school
system on the ground that to do so would constitute an impermissible
frustration of the existing order for desegregation. Emporia argued
that because it was a separate political entity, its decision to establish
an independent system could be enjoined only upon a finding that
the state law under which it acted was unconstitutional, or that the
racial composition of the new system would be unconstitutional. 3
The Court did not find that the statute or the planned system's racial
composition would be unconstitutional. 34 It concluded, however, that
if the "proposal would impede the dismantling of the dual system, then
the district court, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, [could] en-
join it from being carried out."3 5 Any inquiry into the city's motive was
rejected as irrelevant.36 Arguing that it is difficult or impossible for
any court to determine the motive of legislators, the Court stated
that the focus must be "the effect of the action upon the dismantling
of the dual school system .... "37
In United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Educationa the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that action of a state
legislature affecting the desegregation of a dual school system stands
31. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 190 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. La. 1960),
aff'd sub nom. City of New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961).
32. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
33. Id. at 459.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 460.
36. Id. at 462.
37. Id.
38. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
[Vol. 8:265
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/15
DESEGREGATION AND PUBLIC HOUSING
on a footing different from action of a local board.39 The Court held
that if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority operated to
inhibit or to obstruct the disestablishment of a dual school system the
state limitation must fall.- 0
In essence, the legal theory in Gautreaux IV was a fusion of the
holdings in Wright and Scotland Neck applied to a case involving
desegregation in public housing. The Gautreaux IV courts found
that the state statute limited the authority of CHA and thereby oper-
ated to repress or delay the desegregation of Chicago public housing.41
Such a delay in meeting the goals of the 1969 order would not be
tolerated, for "state policy must give way when it operates to hinder
vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." 42
It is significant that the courts have not recognized a distinction
between segregation in education and in housing. Noting that one
school construction case held that location is highly relevant to non-
discriminatory programs, one court analogized "it would, in fact,
be totally unrealistic to say that the location of public housing is
not relevant to the issue of discrimination.' 3 In recognition of this
39. Id. at 488-89.
40. Id. at 488.
41. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1973);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
42. North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971); Gautreaux
v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1973).
43. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D. La. 1969). For discus-
sions of reasons for comparing desegregation of housing and education see Kinoy,
The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts on
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 22 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 537 (1968); Note, Public
Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROn.
253 (1970); Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 343, 348, 360-61 & n.106 (1971).
One author views the problem of discrimination as related to segregation in the
following manner:
One predicate for the proposition that separate treatment is inherently un-
equal is the vulnerability of a traditionally disadvantaged group to discrimina-
tion once its members are separated from the protective company of those
who command governmental respect. This is certainly applicable to residential
circumstance. Residents of ghettos are highly vulnerable to second-rate
municipal services of all sorts, to disadvantage in the process of education,
to functional emasculation of their franchise through gerrymandering, to se-
lective and adverse police practices, and to the abusive tactics of private
merchants.
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the In-
digent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 782 (1969). For an example of discrimination in
municipal services see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), aff'd
en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
1974]
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fact, equal protection cases in housing have accepted the effect theory
as it is applied in school desegregation cases. The Seventh Circuit in
Gautreaux IV referred to cases expressly holding that, in circumstances
involving a long history of discrimination, it is not necessary to prove
that the intent, motive or purpose of local officials had been to dis-
criminate.44 Another court explained the effect theory this way:
judicial inquiry into the purpose or effect of governmental action
is not limited to the moment that the action occurs. Not only
must the "immediate objective" of governmental action be con-
sidered, but the "historical context" and "ultimate effect" of
such action must be considered. . . . The inquiry must further
assess the "reality" of the "law's impact" and consider the "back-
ground" against which state action operates to determine that
reality. . . Therefore, relevant to this inquiry are either past
or prospective governmental actions which form a part of the
background.45
Applying this interpretation of the effect theory, the Gautreaux IV
courts referred to the long history of the district court's efforts to
achieve full implementation of its 1969 order as the background from
which to view the effect of the Council's unexplained failure to act on
CHA sites.
An important practical question is whether the plaintiffs and the
district court are now any closer to obtaining full compliance with
the 1969 decree. Plaintiffs have sought expeditious desegregation of
Chicago public housing, and the Gautreaux courts have agreed with
that purpose. Significantly, however, the ability of the Council
to reject CHA-selected sites involved only one of the Council's
supervisory powers over CHA.46 It must be conceded, at least in
theory, that the holding in Gautreaux IV only circumvents the Coun-
cil's authority to reject sites and does not reach the other aspects of
44. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (1971), aff'd en bane,
461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972), quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Re-
development Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
45. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 694(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971). (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1410(h), 1411(f), 1415(7) (1964). Included in those
provisions is the requirement that the City of Chicago sign a Cooperation Agree-
ment with CHA before federal funds can be applied to CHA projects and that
the local government waive taxes on the property used for public housing. Of
course, these federal statutes do not include the Council's zoning and city plan-
ning powers that affect locations available to CHA. Gautreaux v. City of Chi-
cago, 480 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1973) (Swygert, J., concurring).
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CHA dependence on the Council 47 Given that concession and the
accepted purpose for the Gautreaux IV order, the court might well
have applied, in conjunction with the effect theory, an independent
and supplementary theory wherein the court would have charged the
Council with an affirmative duty to take an active, positive interest
in aiding CHA compliance with the 1969 order. A similar kind of
duty has been found to exist in housing cases by other federal courts.48
Of equal significance is that the Gautreaux courts have in large mea-
sure based their conclusions of law on cases in which the Supreme
Court has placed an obligation on school authorities actively to pur-
sue desegregation in education.49 This analogy could be extended to
hold that local governments are bound by a similar duty to correct
state-imposed segregation in public housing. Authority for the exten-
sion would be based on the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that
school desegregation cases are not considered to "differ fundamentally
from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair
denial of a constitutional right."' 0
47. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1973) (Swygert,
J., concurring).
48. Generally, those courts have charged the particular defendant before the
court with a duty to act in conformity with the national policy of promoting a
balanced and dispersed public housing program. It would not seem unreasonable
to charge the Chicago City Council with what is a more limited duty of placing
its authority solidly behind meeting the 1969 decree. For a collection of cases that
have recognized a national policy of balanced and dispersed public housing see
Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1267
(ND. Ohio 1973) and notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955);
accord, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
50. Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
"The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests,
the condition that offends the Constitution." Id. at 16. See also note 43 supra.
Those interested in public housing problems will probably agree that the result
in Gautreaux IV is a positive step in correcting the segregated housing pattern of
Chicago. Yet one should always be wary of too easily accepting a "good result."
In this regard consider the following:
While precedent is surely the keystone in delineating the legal framework
and constitutional categories that this [case] might fall under it must be noted
that cases of racial discrimination that raise issues of equal protection-due
process denial ... are not fungible pegs that can summarily be slipped, on
a factual level, into previously carved precedential slots. Since the crux of
this genre of cases depends on the delicate balancing of infringed right against
police power any fact unique to a certain case may tip the balance in favor
or against one side and, consequently, one must be wary of relying on mere
hypotheticals or remote analogies.
Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
1974]
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Analysis of this suggested theory begins with the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)11 which estab-
lished the affirmative duty of school officials to act with "all deliberate
speed" to make a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compli-
ance" with court ordered desegregation.52 Once a decree is entered,
the burden is upon school officials to establish that any additional
delay is necessary to the public interest and is consistent with good
faith compliance at the earliest possible date.53 The affirmative duty
includes an obligation to take whatever steps might be necessary to
eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch."64 In one school
construction case a district court held that all agencies of the state,
not just local authorities, are to be charged with an affirmative duty
to disestablish state-imposed segregation.5 Neutrality is to be for-
saken for an active, affirmative interest in carrying out constitutional
commands.5 6
Lower federal courts have found that this nation is committed by
legislative act 57 and judicial decision, 8 to an affirmative policy of
balanced and dispersed public housing."9 The courts have charged
51. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
52. Id. at 300-01.
53. Id. at 300.
54. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
55. Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509, 519 (N.D.
Miss. 1968).
56. Id.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970); Department of Housing & Urban De-
velopment, Low-Rent Housing Manual, § 205.1 (g) (1967). In Shannon v. HUD,
436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970), the court stated: "Whatever were the most
significant features of a workable program ... in 1949, by 1964 such a program
had to be nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to
affirmatively promote fair housing."
58. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257,
1263, 1267 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D.
Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, revd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Crow
v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ga. 1971), af'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); see Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, enforced, 304 F. Supp. 736
(N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd as modified, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 922 (1971).
59. Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1972), af'.d in part,
rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); see 7 URBAN L. ANN. 336 (1974).
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local officials with an obligation to aid that policy unless they can
demonstrate a compelling interest not to do so.60 This policy recog-
nizes that public housing programs can no more confine low-income
blacks to a compacted and concentrated residential area than educa-
tional programs can confine black children to segregated schools.6 1
In Gautreaux IV neither court made reference to any affirmative
duty or obligation on any defendant, nor did they acknowledge that
other courts have found such a duty to exist.62 The entire thrust
of the decisions was based on the effect theory. The injunction in
Gautreaux IV only barred one of the Council's potential dilatory
actions. By suspending the statute, the courts actually relieved the
Council of any responsibility or duty to act. An affirmative duty
charged to the Council would arguably require the City in future
housing actions, as in school cases, to demonstrate that delay was
necessary to the public interest and consistent with a good faith effort
to integrate.
The recent case of Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Au-
thority3 demonstrates the concurrent consideration and application
of the effect and affirmative duty theories. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority (CMHA) made studies that indicated a need for
additional units of low-income housing within its jurisdiction, but
the need for this housing was in cities with whom CMHA did not
have Cooperation Agreements. 64 CMHA made a concerted effort to
negotiate with those communities for such agreements in order to
meet the needs of low-income persons by constructing housing in the
communities where they resided.65 Plaintiffs in this suit argued that
60. See, e.g., cases cited note 58 supra.
61. Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382,
390 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
62. Judge Sprecher, writing for the majority, characterized the holding of Ken-
nedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), as re-
quiring the city to take all necessary steps to enable Kennedy Park to proceed with
its housing project. It is plausible that in doing so he impliedly acknowledged that
some courts have charged local officials with affirmative duties, but it is certain
that none were imposed on the Council in Gautreaux IV.
63. 355 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
64. Id. at 1260-62; see 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970).
65. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257,
1261-62 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
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these municipalities, which had refused to contract with CMHA, had
used the Cooperative Agreement requirement to perpetuate racial
segregation and that they should be enjoined from doing so."0 The
district court held that in the face of a clear and positive need for
public housing within their respective city limits, the suburbs could
not refuse to execute such agreements unless they showed a compel-
ling governmental interest. 67 If they failed to provide such a justifi-
cation, the court would presume the reason to be racial discrimination
and would take "appropriate" action.08
Although the result in Mahaley illustrates a greater reliance on the
"constitutional obligation" of the suburbs to cooperate with CMHA09
66. Id. at 1259.
67. Id. at 1269.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1268-69. The district court found itself faced with a constitutional
dilemma. State officials were clearly acting under color of law and were perform-
ing acts that had a discriminatory effect. The law, however, was federal rather
than state. The refusal of local officials to sign a federally required document
produced the discriminatory effect. The court saw two alternatives. One was to
hold the federal statute unconstitutional as applied. The court rejected that
conclusion because the statute was not in fact unconstitutional as applied to plain-
tiffs, but rather had been used in a manner to perpetuate discrimination. Id.
To avoid that result the court chose a second alternative and ordered CMHA
to prepare a plan for the number of scattered site units it had intended to place
in each of the suburbs. The suburbs would then enter into Cooperation Agree-
ments or face further court action. Id. at 1269.
The district court felt constrained to hold the federal statute constitutional on
its face since the case had originated by the convening of a three-judge district
court that, upon finding the federal statute constitutional, dissolved itself to allow
one judge to decide the remaining issues. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
In Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F. Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 1973), a three-judge panel
upheld the federal requirement of a Cooperation Agreement as constitutional. The
court rejected use of a compelling interest test to review the statute, citing Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (dicta that adequate housing is not a con-
stitutional right), and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding con-
stitutional a referendum requirement for approval of low-income housing).
Instead, the court applied the "minimal scrutiny" test (i.e., if any set of facts can
be conceived that would indicate a rational basis for the local approval require-
ment then the statute is valid) and found two legitimate reasons that support the
statute. First, Congress may have been concerned with insuring that low-income
housing would be consistent with other housing and development already in
effect or planned for the local community. Secondly, Congress may have been con-
cerned with insuring that the possible inflationary effects of public housing would
not jeopardize the housing opportunities of people whose income level placed
them above public housing eligibility. On the issue of refusal of approval by local
officials, the court said, in dicta, that refusal must be based on "legitimate com-
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than on the effect of their refusal to execute Cooperation Agreements,
the latter was considered a necessary element in the court's legal
theory. The district court found ample evidence that the suburbs'
failure to contract with the Authority had the clear effect of violating
the fourteenth amendment by perpetuating existing racial segrega-
tion,70 and that the suburbs provided no adequate or compelling
reason to explain their conduct.7 1
Had such an approach been employed in Gautreaux IV, it would
have forced the Council to demonstrate a compelling reason for its
inaction to approve the sites submitted by CHA.72 Charging the
Council with an affirmative duty to assist CHA in integrating
Chicago public housing would include all aspects of CHA's
dependence on the Council and therefore would require cooperation
by the Council in all phases of the 1969 order. This duty would place
a burden on the Council to demonstrate that any delay was necessary
to a good faith effort. The effect theory, used alone, only resulted in
holding CLA independent of the Council for the purpose of real
estate acquisition. As a practical matter, this may not be enough inde-
pendence in the city that has resisted integration in public housing
sites since the early 1950's.7 3 There would, of course, be no positive
munity concerns which necessitate disapproval" and indicated that the reasons
for its decision on the issue of constitutionality of the statute suggested valid
grounds for a refusal to sign a Cooperation Agreement.
70. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257,
1266-67 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
71. Id. at 1266.
72. The compelling interest test as applied to an existing public housing pro-
gram has yet to be argued before the Supreme Court Since plaintiffs in
Gautreaux IV are entitled by the 1969 decree to restoration of equal protection
under the law, it would seem logical to apply a compelling interest test to those
who are effectively obstructing the court's ability to provide that relief. Such a
view would distinguish Gautreaux IV from James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), in which the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a state consti-
tutional requirement that a referendum be held to approve low-income housing con-
struction. There, the Court held that plaintiffs had not established that a "law...
neutral on its face" had the effect of specially burdening a racial minority. Id. at
141. The Gautreaux courts have already agreed that a constitutional violation
exists, and they are seeking to rectify that condition by the Gautreaux IV decree.
73. See M. IMERSON & E. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING & THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (1955). This is the
classic work on the public policy dimensions of public housing site selection de-
cisions in Chicago. For an overview of the events from 1955 to 1969 see Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il. 1969).
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guarantee of conformance with the court's order based on an affirm-
ative obligation to aid the national policy of balanced and dispersed
public housing, but there would certainly be less room for evasion of
the spirit and goal of the 1969 decree.*
Richard R. Vouga
* Recently the Supreme Court denied the petitions for writ of certiorari of
defendant Council and defendant CHA. Chicago Housing Authority v. Gautreaux,
414 U.S. 1144 (1974); City of Chicago v. Gautreaux, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974).
The latest district court action, Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D.
II. 1973), which denied plaintiffs' request for "a metropolitan plan for relief,"
id. at 690, that would require CHA to build some of the projects necessary under
the 1969 order in areas outside the City of Chicago, has been reversed by the
Seventh Circuit. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, Nos. 74-1048, 74-1049
(7th Cir. Aug. 26, 1974).
The Sixth Circuit has reversed the Mahaley case discussed at pages 275-77
supra. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, No. 73-1407
(6th Cir. July 9, 1974).
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